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VERMES ALBERT 
PROPER NAMES IN TRANSLATION: A CASE 
STUDY 
Abstract: This study is an attempt at explaining the treatment of proper 
names in the Hungarian translation of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five. 
The analysis is carried out in a relevance-theoretic framework, based on the 
assumption that translation is a special form of communication, aimed at 
establishing interpretive resemblance between the source text and the target 
text (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986, and Gutt 1991). The findings seem to 
confirm the view that proper names behave in a predictable way in 
translation: the particular operations chosen to deal with them are, to a great 
extent, a function of the semantic contents they are loaded with in the given 
context. 
1 Introduction 
In an earlier paper (Vermes 1996) I found that the translation of proper 
names is not a simple process of transference, as some authors, for instance 
Vendler (1975) suggested on the assumption that proper names lack 
meaning. The fallacy of this view lies in the faulty nature of the background 
assumption: not all proper names are mere identifying labels - in fact, most 
of them tum out to carry meaning of one sort or another. Then, of course, we 
need to carefully consider the contextual implications of these meanings 
before we can decide how best to render the name in the target language 
(TL). 
I offered three operations for this purpose: transference, translation and 
modification. Here, for reasons that I will explain in a moment, I want to 
refine this a little by distinguishing one further operation which was left 
implicit earlier as a subcase, partly, of translation and, partly, of 
modification: substitution. By this term I will refer to those cases when the 
source language (SL) name has a conventional correspondent in the TL, 
which replaces the SL item in the translation. As we will see, this is true of a 
large number of geographical names, for example. In this case the translator 
(in an ordinary translation situation) is more or less obliged to use this 
correspondent in the translation (Hungarian Anglia for English England). 
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This refinement of classification is made necessary, first of all, by an 
intuitive recognition of the fact that when there is a conventional 
correspondent available in the TL, this would seem to be the translator's first 
and natural choice: the one that comes to mind almost subconsciously. This 
does not mean that no other solution is ever possible, but any digression 
from the most obvious solution would need to be supported by serious 
reasons. In a relevance-theoretic framework we would say that a translation 
using a conventional correspondent is the one that requires the least 
processing effort and any digression, increasing the amount of processing 
effort, would need to be justified by a substantial gain in contextual effects. 
Now which of these four operations the translator employs in a particular 
situation depends primarily on what meanings the proper name has in the 
given context and which of these meanings she thinks important to retain in 
the TL. (From now on, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the 
translator/communicator as she and to the audience as he.) One question we 
will have to examine, then, is what sort of meanings a proper name may 
have and how these meanings can be rendered in the translation. 
Before we can do this, however, we will have to clarify what a proper 
name is. So far we have been content with an implicit understanding of the 
concept but a detailed characterisation of the problem will require that the 
definition is made more or less explicit. 
One basic assumption that we shall draw on in this paper is that 
communication is an ostensive-inferential process, as explicated in Sperber 
and Wilson (1986). A brief outline of their relevance theory is presented in 
the next section and in the subsequent sections we shall carry out our 
analysis of the problem in this relevance-theoretic framework. 
2 Relevance theory and translation 
2.1 Relevance 
The principal assumption of this study is that translation is a special form 
of communication and, as such, is not essentially different from any other 
communicative process. The theory of communication, relevance theory (see 
Sperber and Wilson 1986), that we are going to build on views 
communication as an ostensive-inferential process. Ostensive because in 
every act of communication the communicator makes it manifest to the 
audience that she wants to communicate something; and inferential because 
comprehension involves the audience in constructing a hypothesis about the 
communicator's intentions via spontaneous non-demonstrative inference. 
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The result of this non-demonstrative inferential process, the hypothesis, 
cannot be logically proved but can be confirmed. 
When the communicator utters something, her utterance will be 
interpretable in a number of different ways; however, not all of these 
possible interpretations are equally accessible to the audience. In evaluating 
the various interpretations, the audience is aided by one general criterion 
which can eliminate all but a single possible interpretation: the criterion of 
optimal relevance. The audience can reasonably expect that the 
communicator's message will be relevant to him on the given occasion and, 
moreover, that it is formulated in such a way that will make it easy for him 
to come to the intended interpretation. 
Wilson (1992) gives the following definition of optimal relevance: "An 
utterance, on a given interpretation, is optimally relevant if and only if: (a) it 
achieves enough effects to be worth the hearer's attention; (b) it puts the 
hearer to no unjustifiable effort in achieving those effects" (175). 
This definition of relevance is built on the notions of contextual effect and 
processing effort. A contextual effect arises when, in the given context, the 
new information strengthens or replaces an existing assumption or when, 
combining with an assumption in the context, it results in a contextual 
implication. The effort needed to process the utterance is a function of the 
linguistic complexity of the utterance, the accessibility of the context and the 
inferential effort made in computing the contextual effects of the utterance in 
the given context (Wilson 1992: 174). In brief: the more contextual effects 
and the less processing effort, the more relevant the utterance is to the 
audience on the given occasion. 
It follows, then, that a reasonable communicator will formulate her 
message in such a manner as to enable the audience to come to the desired 
interpretation in the most cost-effective way: that is, she will make sure that 
the first acceptable interpretation that occurs to the audience will be the one 
that she intended to communicate. What this means at the audience's end is 
that as soon as he has found the first interpretation that satisfies his 
expectations of relevance, he has found the one that a rational communicator 
can be reasonably believed to have intended. Eventually, the principle of 
optimal relevance entails that "all the hearer is entitled to impute as part of 
the intended interpretation is the minimal context and set of contextual 
effects that would be enough to make the utterance worth his attention" 
(Wilson 1992: 176). 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), an utterance, or indeed any 
representation which has a propositional form, "can represent some state of 
affairs in virtue of its propositional form being true of that state of affairs," 
that is, descriptively, or "it can represent some other representation which 
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also has a propositional form - a thought, for instance - in virtue of a 
resemblance between the two propositional forms," that is, interpretively 
(228-9). Interpretive resemblance between propositional forms means that 
the two propositions share at least a subset of their analytic and contextual 
implications (their explicatures and implicatures) in the given context 
(Wilson and Sperber 1988: 138). 
2.2 Translation as interpretive language use 
If we want to take account of the fact that utterance meaning is not 
wholly propositional (see, for instance, Lyons 1995), this definition needs to 
be amended. Gutt (1991) extends the notion of interpretive resemblance to 
linguistic utterances. Since explicatures and implicatures are assumptions 
and the function of utterances is to convey assumptions that the 
communicator intends to convey, the definition can be generalised in the 
following way. Two utterances (or any two ostensive stimuli) "interpretively 
resemble one another to the extent that they share their explicatures and/or 
implicatures" (Gutt 1991: 44). 
He then goes on to define translation as interpretive language use across 
languages. In interpretive language use in general, and in translation in 
particular, the principle of relevance entails a presumption of optimal 
resemblance: what is rendered by the communicator (translator) is (a) 
presumed to interpretively resemble the original and (b) the resemblance has 
to be consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance. Here we have a 
new notion of faithfulness in translation (or equivalence - although Gutt 
himself abstains from using this term), which will constrain the what and the 
how in translation: the translation should resemble the original in that it 
offers adequate contextual effects to the audience (comparable to those 
offered by the original); and it should be formulated in such a way that it 
yields the intended interpretation at a minimum processing cost (Gutt 1991: 
101-2). 
Since the notion of interpretive resemblance rests on the notion of 
optimal relevance, its fulfilment is heavily dependent on the similarity of the 
contexts available for the source and target language readers. The same (or, 
at least, similar) effects can be achieved in the translation with minimum 
processing effort only if the two contexts are not essentially different. 
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3 What is a proper name? 
3.1 Definitions of proper name 
Let us begin our search for a suitable elucidation of the term by quoting 
some definitions from various English and Hungarian grammar reference 
books. 
"Proper nouns are basically names, by which we understand the 
designation of specific people, places and institutions [..,]. Moreover, the 
concept of name extends to some markers of time and to seasons that are 
also festivals (Monday, March, Easter, Passover, Ramadan)" (Greenbaum 
and Quirk 1990: 86-7). 
"A proper noun (sometimes called a 'proper name') is used for a particular 
person, place, thing or idea which is, or is imagined to be, unique" 
(Alexander 1988: 38). 
"Nouns that are really names are called proper nouns. Proper nouns 
usually refer to a particular, named person or thing" (Hardie 1992: 122). 
"[A tulajdonnevek] a sok hasonló közül csak egyet neveznek meg, és ezt 
az egyet megkülönböztetik a többi hasonlótól" ([Proper names] name one 
from among many of a similar kind and distinguish this from all the other 
similar ones) (Rácz and Takács 1987: 122). Later on they give the following 
types of proper names: personal names, animal names, geographical names, 
names of institutions and organisations, titles of pieces of art, periodicals and 
newspapers, and brand names. This list is probably not meant to be 
exhaustive - it is still interesting to note that while in the English-speaking 
tradition the concept is generally supposed to include the names of days, 
months, and seasons, it is not so in the Hungarian linguistic tradition. 
There seem to be some inconsistencies between these definitions. First, 
they do not make clear the difference between a proper noun and a proper 
name. Proper nouns like Michael or Exeter are a subclass of the grammatical 
class of nouns, whereas proper names are simple or composite expressions 
formed with words from any of the traditional word classes. For instance, an 
adjective like Fluffy would make a good name for a dog, or a noun phrase 
like The Green Dragon might well be used for a pub. 
Another question arises concerning the specificity, or uniqueness, of the 
entity that bears the name. What do we do with stock names like Emma? 
There may be thousands of people with this name at any particular time in 
history. For a solution, we have to clarify what it means that a name refers to 
an entity. The term reference is commonly taken to characterise the 
relationship between a variable in a propositional representation and the 
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value which is assigned to it on a particular occasion of use. Thus the 
referents of the name Emma on two different occasions of utterance may 
well be two different persons. Words, as such, "do not have reference, but 
may be used as referring expressions or, more commonly, as components of 
referring expressions in particular contexts of utterance" (Lyons 1995: 79). 
Reference as a variable, context-dependent relationship is to be 
differentiated from denotation, which is not utterance-dependent but 
invariant within the language system. Thus we find that while the denotation 
of an expression is part of the semantics of a language, reference belongs to 
the realm of pragmatics. A name, on a particular occasion, may refer to an 
entity without denoting it. 
This is in correspondence with what Donellan (1975) writes about the 
attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions: "In the attributive 
use, the attributive of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in 
the referential use" (102). In effect, here he is making a distinction between 
describing something as such-and-such and referring to something by using 
a certain description, in the act of which "the speaker may say something 
true even though the description correctly applies to nothing" (Donellan 
1975: 110). For example, we may successfully refer to somebody at a party 
as 'the man drinking Martini', even if the person in question is in fact 
drinking something else. The interesting thing, then, is that proper names 
and definite descriptions are not essentially different with respect to 
reference: both can be used to refer successfully without providing a truthful 
description (Donellan 1975: 113). 
Probably the only difference between these two kinds of expression is 
that proper names are used primarily (though by no means necessarily) to 
refer, while other definite descriptions may just as often be used 
attributively, in Donellan's terms. However, a name can also be used 
attributively, perhaps less often but entirely legitimately. Consider the 
following example. That boy is a real Pele.' Here the name 'Pele' is used to 
attribute certain qualities to the referent of 'that boy', concerning his skills in 
football. 
3.2 The meaning of a proper name 
Now if a name can be used attributively, it certainly carries some 
meaning. The question is, what sort of meaning, or meanings, can it have? 
Lyons's (1995) view is that names have no descriptive content (denotation) 
but may have shared associations (connotations) (295). My position is that 
this view is too simplistic. It may be true with stock names but it is certainly 
insufficient, for instance, with names which are based on descriptions. This 
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seems to be supported by the fact that a descriptive name might be changed 
when the underlying description is no longer appropriate. Along these lines 
Lehrer (1992) argues that it is difficult to draw a dividing line between 
descriptive names and pure descriptions and, further, that most names 
provide some sort of information about the referent, that is, they may serve 
as the basis for making reasonable inferences about it (127). 
In relevance theory, the meaning of a lexical item consists in a logical 
entry and an encyclopaedic entry. The three different types of information 
(lexical, logical and encyclopaedic) are stored in different places in memory. 
The logical entry contains a set of deductive rules making up, in Lyons's 
terms, the intension (logical properties) of the lexical item, while the 
encyclopaedic entry contains information about the extension of the item 
(the group of entities it stands for) in the form of assumptions about it 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 86). I take it that the encyclopaedic entry also 
contains information about shared associations. 
The major difference between the logical and the encyclopaedic entries is 
that the former is finite and holds computational information, whereas the 
latter is open-ended and holds representational information. Sperber and 
Wilson suggest that when we process an assumption, the content is 
determined by the logical entries of the concepts it contains and the context 
in which it is processed is, at least partly, determined by the encyclopaedic 
entries of these concepts (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 91). 
In this model, prototypical proper names (that is names without a 
descriptive content) are handled by associating with them empty logical 
entries. In other (less prototypical) cases a name may also have a logical 
entry (or, in the case of a composite name, it may include several logical 
entries which combine to make up the logical content of the name) which is 
partly or fully definitional (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 91-2). Thus names 
seem to be not essentially unlike any other kinds of expression in terms of 
the structure of their meaning. Rather, what we find here is a continuum of 
various sorts of proper names, ranging from the prototypical (with a primary-
referential function) to the non-prototypical (with a stressed attributive 
function), which are practically indistinguishable from other non-referring 
definite descriptions. The fact that I use the terms prototypical and non-
prototypical, however, is not meant to imply that the so-called prototypical 
names are more frequent than non-prototypical ones. 
3.3 Types of proper names 
One further question that remains unclear from our initial definitions is 
what sort of entities may be referred to by a proper name. Here I see no 
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reason to exclude any possible class of referents, living or inanimate, 
concrete or abstract, real or imaginary. The point is that a name, in a given 
utterance and context, singles out one unique entity or one unique class of 
entities which is to bind the variable represented by the name in the 
propositional representation of the utterance. In theory, we may distinguish 
as many types of proper names as many classes of entities we can discern in 
the world. For instance, at first glance it may seem weird that computers 
should have names but in actual fact they do, since the dawn of computer 
networks. Thus, if we find it necessary for some reason, why not set up a 
separate category for the names of computers? 
4 The hypothesis 
It is expected that names with an empty logical entry (stock names like 
John, for instance) are normally simply transferred, unless the encyclopaedic 
entry contains some assumptions that may be needed as part of the context, 
in which case the name is likely to be modified, depending on the context 
and the available options. 
Names with a filled-in logical entry would normally undergo translation, 
unless the encyclopaedic entry again contains some assumptions that may be 
needed as part of the context, which would make necessary the modification 
of the name in the TL. 
The presence of an established conventional TL correspondent would 
seem to generally pre-empt any other option, requiring the substitution of 
this correspondent for the SL name but may be overriden by the other 
processes if the translator considers it inadequate in the given context. 
5 Materials and method 
In this study I used a recent British edition of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughter-
house Five and a Hungarian translation by László Nemes (see Primary 
sources). First all the different proper names were looked up in the original 
text and matched with the corresponding expressions in the translation. For 
each name, only the first occurrence in the text was recorded. 
The original names were then sorted out into four groups according to the 
operation the translator used in dealing with them. Four operations are 
distinguished: transference, substitution, translation and modification. By 
transference we shall mean the process of rendering the name in the TL in 
the original form. Substitution is replacing the SL name by a conventional 
TL correspondent. Translation means rendering the SL name, or at least part 
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of it, by a TL expression which gives rise to the same, or approximately the 
same analytic implications (explicatures) in the target text; modification 
consists in replacing the original name with a TL one which involves a 
substantial alteration in the translation of either the analytic or the contextual 
implications (implicatures) that the name effects. For further clarification the 
reader is referred to Vermes (1996). 
Subsequently, the names in each group were assigned to various types. 
The types used are the following: names of persons; geographical names; 
names of institutions and organisations; titles of paintings, books, 
periodicals, newspapers, etc.; brand names; names of nationalities; names of 
events; names of periods of time; names of abstract ideas; names of animals; 
names of species; and the remaining few were collapsed under the heading 
other names. A full list is given in the Appendix, with the names presumably 
having an at least partially filled-in logical entry italicised. 
The validity of the hypothesis was checked by examining under each 
operation the occurrences of names with or without a filled-in logical entry 
(Table 1). 
Under each operation, the number of occurrences in each type was 
weighed against the total number of occurrences in the given type. This was 
done to find out whether there are characteristic differences in the treatment 
of the various types of proper names (Table 2). 
Then the data were rearranged under each operation in descending order 
of the percentages within each type to check the extent to which the different 
operations apply to the various types (Table 3). 
Finally, individual cases which seem in some sense exceptional were 
considered with respect to a relevance-theoretic model. 
6 Results and discussion 
6.1 Implications of the numerical results 
The numerical findings are summed up in Table 1. The results seem to 
confirm the validity of our hypothesis: names with an empty logical entry 
are mainly transferred, while those with at least some logical content are to a 
great extent translated. The large number of substituted items in both groups 
should come as no surprise; it is simply due to the fact that several SL names 
have their established correspondents in the TL, any departure from which 
would result in an increase in the effort required to process the given 
utterance. According to the requirement of optimal relevance, this could only 
be done in special cases when the gains on the effects side would be greater 
than the losses on the efforts side. 
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LOGICAL 
ENTRY 
TRANSFER SUBST. TRANSL. MOD. TOTAL 
EMPTY 108 54 0 12 174 
FILLED-IN 22 65 56 11 154 
Table 1: Primary numerical findings 
What needs some further consideration is, on the one hand, the relatively 
high number of transferred items in the group with filled-in logical entries 
and, on the other hand, the causes for the modification of 12 and 11 items in 
the two groups, respectively, since modification apparently does not depend 
solely on the presence or absence of a filled-in logical entry. 
Among the 22 transferred cases in the second group we find 10 personal 
names. Of these, some (like Stephen Crane) belong to real persons and 
would not therefore be normally translated in the target culture (Hungarian). 
Among the others, belonging to fictitious persons, we can distinguish 
between those, like Resi North, that have no obvious connotations in the 
context of the story and those, like Billy Pilgrim, with rather obvious 
connotations evoked in the given context from the encyclopaedic entry of the 
expression. What seems surprising, then, is that the names in this latter 
subgroup are transferred and not translated (or modified), since these are 
telling names in the most apparent manner: Billy Pilgrim really is making a 
pilgrimage in the story through time and space, Montana Wildhack is a porno 
star, and Roland Weary really is a nuisance to everybody around him. The 
translator's decision not to translate these names can be explained in the 
following way. Vonnegut creates his unique artistic world by mixing real 
and imaginary events and persons. In the context of the story (in this 
particular fictitious world), however, all the persons are thought of as real. 
Therefore, translating a name like Billy Pilgrim as Zarándok Billy, for 
instance, would be inconsistent with the practice of transferring the great 
majority of the other personal names and would probably cause an 
unwarranted increase of processing effort that would not be justified by the 
achieved contextual effect, which is rendering more perspicuous by the name 
the role of the character in the story. We could argue in a similar way in the 
case of Eliot Rosewater and Kilgore Trout, adding that the possibility of a 
desired measure of contextual effects is lessened further by the fact that 
these characters play no significant role in the book. Moreover, they also 
appear in other novels by Kurt Vonnegut, in the Hungarian translations of 
which their names are transferred and thus translating them here would be 
inconsistent with the general translation practice in this extended fictitious 
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world, resulting in an additional increase of processing effort with readers 
who are familiar with it. 
Thus the translator's decision seems to be justified here on two grounds. 
He avoids putting the TL reader to extra processing effort by being 
consistent both within the world of the given text and within a wider 
universe of discourse including this and related texts. This then goes to show 
that calculations of contextual effect and processing effort involve, apart 
from considerations of prevailing translation practices in the TL, not only 
textual but intertextual factors as well. 
The other names in the second subgroup include some geographical, 
institutional and brand names, which are again normally either transferred or 
substituted in the general Hungarian practice. The two animal names, 
Princess and Spot, are probably not translated in order to avoid incongruity 
with a world predominantly containing English names in the Hungarian 
translation, which is all the more logical since the two dogs do not have any 
significant role to play in the story. 
6.2 Discussion of modified items 
Now let us turn our attention toward the modified items. 12 of them have 
an empty logical entry, 11 an at least partly filled-in one, which suggests that 
the translator's decision to modify the expressions could not be based on the 
presence or absence of some logical content alone. We find four personal 
names here. Mutt and Jeff are rendered in the TT as Zoro and Huru. The 
reason is obvious: in the SL Mutt and Jeff have in the encyclopaedic entry 
associated with them the assumption that they form a comic couple and since 
it is not present in the TL, the names had to be changed for ones that will 
carry a comparable assumption. A similar explanation would go for Joe 
College, rendered as Tudósjános (Scholarly John) and possibly for Wild Bob, 
rendered as Félelmetes Bob (Frightful Bob). 
Of the two geographical names, Stamboul occurs in a small poem and is 
turned into Törökhon (Turkey) simply to make two lines rhyme. A similar 
example is the nationality expression Polack, which is explicated in the TL 
as lengyel nő (a Polish woman). It appears in the last line of a ditty, cited in 
the book, and is probably used instead of the literal translation lengyel purely 
because of reasons of rhyme and rhythm. The other geographical term, 
Russia, becomes az orosz front (the Russian front) in the translation, 
explicating in the logical entry what was part of the encyclopaedic entry of 
the original. Why this change had to take place is not entirely clear. On the 
one hand, the TL expression makes it explicit what was implicit as part of 
the context in the SL, thereby reducing the inferential effort required; 
171 
however, it does this at the cost of increasing the effort needed to process the 
linguistically more complex phrasal expression in the TL. Thus it would 
appear that what is gained at the one end is lost at the other. The only 
obvious justification for this move would be if it was difficult for a 
Hungarian reader to evoke from encyclopaedic memory, as part of the 
context, that Russia was one of the major scenes in the Second World War, 
which it is not. Eventually, we could resort for a possible explanation to the 
idea that translation is also to a large extent a matter of personal taste: when 
two alternatives seem to be identical in efficiency the translator will make 
the decision on the basis of her personal preferences. 
Among the institutional names we see two different cases. In the one an 
acronym is turned into the full expression: AP becomes Associated Press in 
the TL, UP is changed into United Press, and the Ilium Y.M.C.A. into iliumi 
Keresztény Ifjak Egyesülete. The reason in all the three instances is the same: 
the acronym has no meaning whatsoever in the TL and would consequently 
make the processing unbearably costly if left unchanged. The explication in 
the third example is rather self-evident but how could the first two cases be 
justified? Probably the translator thought the full name is more likely to 
"ring the bell" in the TL reader than the acronym, that is, it would put the 
reader to less processing effort. However, there seems to be a better solution 
to this problem, which is applied in the following three examples: Holiday 
Inn is rendered as Holiday Inn-szálló, Harvard as Harvard egyetem, and 
Holt, Reinhart and Wilson as Holt, Reinhart és Wilson kiadó. Here, for 
reasons of cultural differences, the SL expression does not give rise to the 
same encyclopaedic assumptions in the TL as in the SL and therefore this 
part of the context needs to be explicated in the logical entry of the TL name. 
The procedure is similar to what happened to Russia, explained in the 
previous paragraph, the difference being that here the explications seem to 
be better motivated than in the Russia-example. 
Exactly the same takes place in the case of the three brand names, the 
temporal expression Gay Nineties, in the case of Georgian and Ferris wheel 
in the other names group, and one of the titles, the Ilium News Leader. The 
other title, Gideon Bible is similar in that it contains encyclopaedic 
information not available in the TL, but here the explication of this content 
would have been very costly since it should have included an explanation of 
what the Gideon Society was and therefore the translator decided to cancel 
this part. This results in the loss of some encyclopaedic assumptions but, 
since these are not essential for processing the utterance in which the name 
occurs, this loss is not fatal and is completely justifiable. 
We still have one nationality name to discuss and one in the other names 
group. The British is rendered in the translation as angolok (the English), 
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instead of the logically closer britek. Why? The reason is very simple: the 
word brit does not have wide currency in Hungarian, except in a historico-
political context. By using this term the translator would have deviated from 
standard Hungarian usage, thereby increasing the processing cost of the 
utterance, which he wisely avoided, applying the admittedly less precise but 
more commonly used term angol. The Febs is the name of an amateur vocal 
quartet of men in the book and is turned into a NŐK (The WOMEN). It is 
difficult to see what encyclopaedic assumptions the translator sought to 
preserve here; the only one that seems apparent is that the name was meant 
to be jocular in some way. 
In summary, the modification of an item is generally made necessary by 
the absence of some encyclopaedic assumptions in the TL which the name 
carries with it in the SL and the absence of which from the target text would 
result in the loss of some relevant contextual implications in the given 
context. We have also seen two exceptional cases where the modification 
takes place for prosodic reasons. 
6.3 Frequency of use of the four operations with the various types of 
name 
Finally we shall check out whether there are any characteristic 
differences in the frequencies of use of the four techniques with the various 
name types. The relevant numbers and percentages are given in Table 2. 
TYPE 
NUMBER 
TRANSFER 
NUMBER : % 
SUBSTITUT. 
NUMBER : % 
TRANSLAT. 
NUMBER:% 
MODIFICAT. 
NUMBER : % 
PERSONAL 97 71 : 73.2 19 : 19.6 3:3.1 4:4.1 
GEOGR. 93 39 : 41.9 50 : 53.8 2 : 2.15 2 : 2.15 
INSTITUTE 48 9 : 18.8 12:25 21 : 43.7 6 : 12.5 
TITLE 31 2 : 6.45 8 : 25.8 19 : 61.3 2 :6.45 
BRAND 18 7 : 38.9 2 : 11.1 6 : 33.3 3 : 16.7 
NATIONAL. 9 0 : 0 7 : 77.8 0 : 0 2 : 22.2 
EVENT 8 0 : 0 7 : 87.5 1 : 12.5 0 : 0 
TEMPORAL 7 0 : 0 6 : 85.7 0 : 0 1 : 14.3 
OTHER 7 0 : 0 0 : 0 4 : 57.1 3 : 42.9 
ABSTRACT 6 0 : 0 6: 100 0 : 0 0 : 0 
ANIMAL 2 2:100 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 
SPECIES 2 0 : 0 2: 100 0 : 0 0 : 0 
TOTAL 328 130 : 39.6 119 : 36.3 56 : 17.1 23:7 
Table 2. The data are arranged in descending order of the number of occurrences 
of the different types. This number is taken as 100% in each case; the percentages in 
each line under the various operations are relative to this. 
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We find that while, for instance, personal names are mostly transferred 
and geographical names characteristically substituted or transferred, 
institutional names are predominantly translated. These findings are easily 
explicable on the basis of what has been described above. The reason is that 
personal names in most cases lack any logical content and are therefore 
transferred, geographical names are either without an identifiable or relevant 
logical content and are transferred or have established translations in the TL 
and are thus substituted, whereas institutional names characteristically 
contain elements with some logical information relating to the function of 
the institution or organisation and are consequently translated. Titles are 
mostly translated, obviously, because a title is normally descriptive of its 
referent and must therefore carry logical information. Brand names are of 
two major types: either they are fanciful names with no relevant logical 
content or they are in some way descriptive of the product they stand for; in 
the former case they would be transferred, in the latter, translated. (We must 
note here, however, that in 'real life' this picture may be complicated by 
several other factors like assonance, cultural dominance, etc.) Nationalities 
have their established names in every culture, so these names are normally 
substituted. The same is true with major events, temporal units or festivals, 
abstract ideas and species. The other names group includes names of objects 
(the Iron Maiden of Nuremburg), a style (Georgian) and a vocal quartet (The 
Febs). They either contain some descriptive information in the logical entry, 
in which case they are translated or build on associated assumptions 
contained in the encyclopaedic entry, not present in the TL, in which case 
they get modified. The two animal names are transferred in this book 
because neither the logical nor the encyclopaedic entries contain any 
relevant information. 
Table 3 shows the same data arranged under each operation in 
descending order of the percentages relating to the frequency of use of the 
operation with the given type of name. It must be noted that while the 
statistical data are characteristic of this particular translation, they may be 
substantially different with others, and our explanations of individual cases 
above hold only as far as they seem to be systematic and consistent 
throughout this translation. 
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TRANSFERENCE 
TYPE : % 
SUBSTITUTION 
TYPE : % 
TRANSLATION 
TYPE:% 
MODIFICATION 
TYPE: % 
ANIMAL : 100 ABSTRACT: 100 TITLE: 61.3 OTHER : 42.9 
PERSONAL : 73.2 SPECIES : 100 OTHER : 57.1 NATIONAL. : 22.2 
GEOGRAPH. : 41.9 EVENT : 87.5 INSTITUT.: 43.7 BRAND : 16.7 
BRAND : 38.9 TEMPORAL : 85.7 BRAND : 33.3 TEMPORAL : 14.3 
INSTITUT. : 18.8 NATIONAL.: 77.8 EVENT: 12.5 INSTITUT. : 12.5 
TITLE : 6.45 GEOGRAPH. : 53.8 PERSONAL: 3.1 TITLE : 6.45 
NATIONAL. : 0 INSTITUTION : 25 GEOGRAPH. : 2.15 GEOGRAPH. : 2.15 
EVENT:0 TITLE : 25.8 ANIMAL : 0 PERSONAL : 4.1 
TEMPORAL:0 PERSONAL : 19.6 NATIONAL. : 0 ANIMAL : 0 
OTHER:0 BRAND : 11.1 TEMPORAL : 0 EVENT:0 
ABSTRACT:0 ANIMAL : 0 ABSTRACT:0 ABSTRACT:0 
SPECIES : 0 OTHER:0 SPECIES : 0 SPECIES : 0 
TOTAL : 39.6 TOTAL : 36.3 TOTAL: 17.1 TOTAL:7 
Table 3. The data are presented in descending order of the percentages, taken 
from Table 2, under each operation. 
7 Conclusions 
One of the interesting results of this study is the confirmation of the fact 
that contrary to what Vendler said, namely that proper names do not require 
translation into another language (Vendler 1975: 117), they often do or, in 
several cases, they get modified. This is not surprising in view of our 
assumption that proper names have basically the same semantic structure as 
any other kinds of expression. Of course, much depends on what we regard 
as a proper name. In our understanding the category includes a wide range of 
expressions - in fact, the difficult thing would be to tell where the list of 
members in the class ends. At the one end of the scale we find the most 
prototypical names, proper nouns, which supposedly lack any logical content 
but may carry several assumptions in the encyclopaedic entry. At the other 
extreme we have composite names made up of words from any of the lexical 
and grammatical word classes: nouns, adjectives, adverbs, even verbs, 
prepositions, articles, auxiliaries, and so on. These names, which I call 
phrasal names, are no different in terms of logical content from any ordinary 
phrasal expression. What makes them names, eventually, is that they are 
used as such in the given context. It seems to me that a name is more of a 
pragmatic category than a semantic one. 
As regards the choice of the appropriate operation in dealing with a 
particular name, several factors may contribute to the final decision. One, of 
course, is the semantic contents of the name. Our hypothesis appears to be 
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confirmed by the statistical results: names with an empty logical entry are 
mostly transferred, whereas those with an at least partly filled-in logical 
entry are largely translated - unless a conventional TL correspondent pre-
empts these options or the encyclopaedic entry of the name contains some 
relevant assumptions which necessitate the modification of the name in the 
TL. 
These findings are easily explained on the basis of our initial assumption 
that translation is a communicative process, governed by the principle of 
optimal resemblance. On this assumption, the choice of a particular 
translation operation in a given situation is made in line with the need to 
preserve, as far as possible, the range of contextual effects that the semantic 
contents of the name contribute to in the source text. Thus, when the logical 
entry contains information, it is preserved by applying the operation of 
translation proper; when the encyclopaedic entry contains relevant 
information, it can be preserved by modifying the name in the translation. 
On the other hand, the relatively large number of substituted cases is 
explicable by evoking the notion of processing effort: the use of a 
conventional correspondent is clearly the solution that requires the least 
amount of effort from the audience. Therefore, a reasonable translator will 
consider a different solution only when the gains in effects would probably 
outweigh the losses caused by the increase of processing effort. 
Another factor in the decision to apply a particular operation, as we have 
seen in several examples, is the need to maintain consistency in the 
translation on three different plains: with prevailing practices (standard 
usage) in the TL, with characteristic solutions across texts and with solutions 
within the given text. This train of thought, again, leads us straight to 
considerations of the balance between contextual effects and processing 
effort. 
In summary, we have found that the pragmatic theory we have chosen to 
couch our examinations in, relevance theory, appears adequate for our 
purposes: it has enabled us to explain in lucid terms how and, partly, why the 
particular operations were applied in particular cases. 
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